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PRIORITIES 
Edgar N. Durfee 
[ Among those of Edgar Durfee's colleagues who were familiar with this 
paper it came to be known as "Little Nemo," for a reason that will become 
apparent to the reader. It is taken from his mimeographed Cases on Se-
curity, third edition, published in 1938. Possibly it was published earlier 
but there is a gap in the evidence. It did not appear in the first edition 
published in 1934 but no copy of the second edition has been located. In 
a few places its age shows, for example in the reference to Walsh as the 
author of the most recent text on real property, and it should of course 
be read with an understanding of the time factor. A few cross-references 
and passages directed to classroom or other student use have been deleted 
but these changes are minor. Otherwise, with exception of some brack-
eted citations, the text is just as it was published. Because of its length it 
is being published in the Review in two parts.] 
T HIS note will attempt an elementary view of the whole sub-ject of priorities. In one sense it will be shallow, avoiding 
microscopic details as far as possible. In another sense it will be 
deep and somewhat difficult to follow, as any elementary study 
must be. Its method will be essentially comparative. Things which 
have not been commonly associated in professional thought will 
be brought together, exhibiting their resemblances or differences, 
as the case may be. The emphasis will be on legal concepts,-in 
other words, upon lawyers' thinking-but we must examine these 
concepts critically, which means that we must give some attention 
to their social implications. 
ORIENTATION 
It is assumed that the reader has considerable knowledge of 
this subject, but it is also assumed that his knowledge is of the 
, fragmentary sort which our profession has usually cultivated. To 
bring this learning into focus, it is necessary to be quite explicit 
about its disjointed character. \i\Te have not commonly thought of 
the whole subject of priorities as one subject. Priorities with re-
spect to land have been discussed in courses and in treatises on land 
law; priorities with respect to chattels are treated as part of the 
subject of sales; like problems concerning corporate stock are made 
a chapter in the law of corporations, etc. But these lines of cleavage 
are crossed by others. For example, in treating of trusts we take 
up the priority problems which are generated by that legal insti-
tution, lumping as far as possible cases of land, chattels and intan-
gibles. Again we set out to discuss creditors' rights and remedies 
and promptly find ourselves dealing with priority problems, touch-
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ing all of the several types of property. So, in this course, when we 
came to study subrogation we took the priority problems in our 
stride, and later on we shall do the same thing in our study of 
real securities. Query whether you have taken any course in this 
school which did not bring up some problems in priorities? Per-
haps Torts? If so, it was by virtue of careful exclusion of such 
questions, for they may be the critical questions in a case involv-
ing tort to property. 
But this is not the whole story. Even within particular fields, 
such as land law, one does not find a well-organized and systematic 
treatment of priorities. This may be illustrated by reference to 
the most recent text on real property, that of Walsh. The author's 
only systematic discussion of priorities is in a chapter entitled "Re-
cording of Deeds and Conveyances." Common law and equity doc-
trines of priority get one short paragraph, introductory to this 
chapter, and the discussion of the recording acts is substantially 
confined to their operation in cases of bona fide purchase. The 
vital and difficult questions concerning their effect upon creditors 
is given one brief and wholly inadequate paragraph at the end. 
These remarks are not made for the purpose of disparaging Walsh, 
for the point is precisely that his treatment of priorities is typical 
of real property literature. Nor is it the intention to condemn the 
whole ·profession for its casual way of dealing with this subject. 
The reason for this critique of prevailing methods is that one can-
not understand the law of priorities unless he is conscious of the 
disjointed way in which it has grown up. 
In this connection it may be well to observe that the title we 
have chosen, "Priorities," does not have any settled meaning. Law-
yers use this term frequently, but in the context of a particular 
case, which makes it quite unnecessary to inquire how much of the 
law belongs under this head. In texts and digests this term has not 
been used as the title for a distinct department of the law, except 
in Tiffany's Real Property, where it is the caption of a chapter. 
As one would expect (words being both cause and effect of 
thought) Tiffany has the best rounded treatment of this subject 
to be found in the real property books. 
Now a word of caution is needed. We must not exaggerate the 
disjunctive character of the law of priorities. Frequently author-
ities from one field are applied in another, viewed perhaps as 
analogy rather than direct authority. And sometimes we have been 
too much given to doctrinal generalization, ignoring factual di£-
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ferences which exist, for example, between land and chattels. How 
could it be otherwise, since related things must be subjected to 
comparative study if we are to grasp either their resemblances or 
their differences, and few lawyers have even as much as started 
upon a comparative study of priorities. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
It will save time in the end if we spend time now in definition 
of certain terms which inevitably enter into any discussion of 
priorities. The word "title" has a wealth of meanings. Sometimes 
it is used to denote absolute ownership-that is to say, the most 
absolute ownership known to the law, which in the case of land 
is the unencumbered fee simple. In this sense there can be but one 
title to any given res, and to speak of "conflicting titles" would be 
a contradiction in terms. But "title" is also used in a more limited 
sense. A lawyer would not hesitate to say, "A has title to Black-
acre," if he believed A to be mvner subject only to an outstanding 
term for years, or easement, or mortgage. Again, he might say 
that a mortgage has title, meaning that the whole legal estate of 
mortgagor (presumably a fee simple) is transferred to mortgagee, 
leaving but an equitable estate in the former. How far this is a 
true statement of mortgage law we need not at this moment in-
quire: it is enough to note this use of the word "title." 
Next we come to some most interesting uses of this term. Con-
veyancers, especially when they are dealing with priorities, apply 
it to all kinds of property rights,-for example, to a term for years 
as well as to a fee, and to a mortgagee's interest whether regarded 
as a title in the sense above indicated, or as a lien. If A negotiates 
a sale to B of a leasehold estate in land, or a note and mortgage of 
land, B's counsel will advise an examination of A's "title." Then, 
after a preliminary examination which throws up certain dubious 
points requiring closer scrutiny, the examiner might be heard 
to say that, "A has a title," meaning merely that his claim is not 
wholly unfounded. In his discussion of the reserved points, the 
examiner may use the word "title" in still another sense, as indi-
cating the transactions and events on which A's claim rests-
execution of deeds, entry of judgments, enjoyment of possession, 
birth of heirs and death of ancestors, etc. Again, with a slight 
shift of meaning, he may apply the term to the documents of title, 
or to the abstract of such documents. But what are the points 
under discussion? Seventy years ago, one of the owners in A's 
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chain of title executed a mortgage which has never been released. 
Fifty years ago, another of A's predecessors executed a deed in 
which his wife, if any, did not join. One of the li:r~ks in the chain 
is a will of doubtful meaning, or doubtful validity. At each point, 
there are possible adverse claims-possible merely, not actively 
asserted at this time. Discussion of these points moves in the realm 
of probability, and the pro9abilities are weighed, not merely 
counted. How likely is it that this claim will be asserted, and how 
serious will it be, if asserted? Again, if we pass this title, how likely 
that other conveyancers will reject it when B wishes to sell? Finally, 
you may find the examiner displaying a dual personality. As 
la·wyer, he may render an opinion that the title is unmarketable, 
pointing out the flaws which are regarded as fatal, perhaps with 
a suggestion that A can cure them by a bill to quiet title1 but, 
as man of affairs, he may advise B that the defects are not serious 
enough to warrant rejection of a good bargain. As in most of the 
practical affairs of life, relativity is the order of thought. Titles 
are seldom absolutely good or absolutely bad, except in professors' 
hypotheticals. 
Observe, now, that in the conveyancer's senses of the word 
"title," we may have conflicting titles, and a large segment of the 
lawyer's business is summarized by that expression. It embraces 
all disputes concerning property except those which turn on the 
rights of enjoyment pertaining to a particular kind of estate or 
interest, typified by the nuisance case where each party admits the 
other's "title" but disputes the contents of that bundle. 
Now comes another of those conveniently evasive phrases of 
the conveyancer, "paper title." Sometimes it carries the implica-
tion that there is really no title, only paper, but at least as often 
it is noncommittal on this point. And it does not necessarily mean 
a title which is all on paper, with a chain of deeds all the way 
from Uncle Sam to the present owner. Interjection of intestate 
succession as the link between two of the parties in the chain does 
not deprive the title of this name.1 Neither is it improper to apply 
it to a title which originates, not in a patent from the sovereign, 
but in adverse possession, provided that the present claimant has 
1 Modern probate practice commonly gets the inheritance link into the court record, 
as a matter of course, and thence it may get into the records of the register of deeds. In 
the older practice, still surviving in some measure, there was no formal record of inher-
itance unless controversy led to an ejectment or a bill to quiet title, or some other bel-
ligerent proceeding. 
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a sheaf of conveyances connecting him with the original disseisor. 
How many conveyances? Would one be enough? This is another 
point on which our profession has not troubled itself with exact-
ness. When your material is relative, you need a vocabulary well 
stocked with elastic words. 
Now come the terms "original title" and "derivative title." 
Each has its utility, and up to a certain point it is convenient to 
use them antithetically to mark the difference between one title 
and another. Granted that all titles are derivative in the sense that 
there can be no title except so far as the state, through its legal 
system, grants it, yet there are important differences between, let 
us say, a title by adverse possession and a title by patent from the 
sovereign with a chain of conveyances from the patentee. We 
need a pair of terms to express this difference. But these terms 
cater to the natural thirst of the human mind for perfect antith-
esis. Almost inevitably, we build a classification of titles as "orig-
inal" and "derivative." Under the first head we put title by admir-
alty decree, title by adverse possession, tax title, etc. Under the 
other head we put title by descl:!nt and by will, title by deed, title 
by execution sale, etc. But does that fit the facts of experience? 
In the preceding paragraph, we put the case of a title originating 
in disseisin, ripening by adverse possession, and transferred by 
deed. Such a title is original from one point of view but derivative 
from another. Nor is it necessarily a case where the title ripened 
in the hands of the original disseisor and only then became the 
subject of transfer. Adverse possession can be established by the 
aggregate possession of a series of persons who are connected by 
transfer. Furthermore, a title originating in adverse possession 
may be good as against one prior owner but not as against another. 
A life tenant, who could have sued the disseisor, may be barred, 
while a remainderman, who had no action against the disseisor, is 
not barred. Again, if one of two former cotenants was under dis-
ability of infancy, while the other was sui juris, the latter may be 
barred while the former is not. Before you can say that a title by 
adverse possession is a good title, you must consider it in relation 
to the persons who might contest it. This being so, might it not 
be better (more useful) to think of title by adverse possession as 
derived from the adverse parties? We might say that the law pred-
icates transfer of title upon the fact of possession, under certain 
circumstances, very much as it predicates transfer of title upon 
death, under certain circumstances, or upon the delivery of a 
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deed, under certain circumstances. The factual bases of transfer 
in these several cases are different, yet not utterly different. Sim-
ilar observations hold true of title by bona fide purchase, which 
is sometimes classified as original because the vendor did not have 
title to transfer, and the true owner did not make any transfer. 
Yet you know that bona fide purchase from T, trustee, may give 
title as against C, cestui que trust, but not against X who has rights 
superior to both T and C, let us say by mortgage. In this case, too, 
you must consider the purchaser's title in relation to the particular 
adverse claimants, and you would insure this wholesome approach 
to the case if you thought of bona fide purchase as a process of 
derivation of title from these persons. That is surely a more useful 
analysis than one which lumps these cases with the admiralty 
decree. 
On the other hand, the Hohfeldian jurists say, in effect, that 
there is no such thing as a derivative title. The idea that the 
rights of A can be transferred to B involves, they insist, a child-
ish reification of rights, treating them as sticks and stones which 
can be boxed and shipped. What really happens in the so-called 
transfer of rights is, in their analysis, the extinguishment of· 
the rights, powers, privileges and immunities of the so-called 
transferor and the creation of a new set of rights, powers, privi-
leges and immunities in the so-called transferee. Is this a dry 
philosophy? Certainly no one will discard the handy term "trans-
fer." Yet Hohfeld performed a service in reminding us that 
there is nothing in the phenomenon of transfer which requires 
us to think of it as a delivery of the antecedent rights of the 
transferor. His analysis gives us at least as accurate a description 
of the results of the transfer. And is it not a better description, 
in that it leaves a comfortable place for the exceptional cases 
where a transferee gets more than his transferor had? That is, of 
course, what happens in cases of bona fide purchase.2 Hohfeld 
also makes a place for cases where the transferee gets less than 
his transferor had, as when a bona fide purchaser from a trustee 
reconveys to the trustee. In short, what this analysis does for 
us is to make us quite conscious that there is nothing in the 
nature of a transfer which makes it inevitable that the transferee 
2 Or do you prefer the analysis developed in the preceding paragraph? The active 
vendor may be said to have exercised a power to transfer the interest of the passive third 
person. Therefore, there are two transferors, the one acting in his own person, the other 
by agent. This analysis is very neat in some cases but gets you into difficulties in others. 
1959] PRIORITIES 465 
should get precisely the rights of his transferor, neither more nor 
less. The writer feels sure that careless thinking about ownership 
as if it were a physical thing, and thinking of transfer of ownership 
as if it were transportation (aliter, conveyance) of that physical 
thing, have done much harm. Especially is this true when the 
reification of transfer is embodied in such telling figures of 
speech as that "the stream cannot rise higher than its source." 
That invokes the laws of hydrostatics, which surely is not in 
order. But that kind of thinking has had distinct influence upon 
the law of priorities, notably cramping the doctrine of bona fide 
purchase. Furthermore, a lawyer is in some danger of failing 
to make the most of existing law if he approaches bona fide 
purchase problems with the simple notion that "transfer is trans-
fer," and that's all there is to it. 
Such reflections drive the writer to the conclusion that a 
two-fold classification of titles as original and derivative does 
more harm than good, a conclusion in which he has the support 
of legal scholars who know more about property than he does. 
On the other hand, the words "derive," "derivative," etc., are 
very useful in the discussion of certain priority problems. We 
could not dispense with them unless we indulged in expensive 
circumlocutions. The same thing is true of the words "transfer" 
and "convey." In spite of their misleading implications, we must 
use them. The course of wisdom, then, is to accept all these words 
as part of the legal vocabulary, at the same time resolving not 
to let them become our masters. 
For the purpose of the ensuing discussion, the writer proposes 
to use the word "transfer" with a freedom which might distress 
some lawyers. He will apply it not only to consensual transfers, 
"by act of the parties," but also to succession at death, testate or 
intestate, to expropriation by creditors' process, to subrogation-
in short, to all the processes by which, in the common parlance 
of our profession, one person may succeed to another's rights. 
In any such discussion as we are entering upon, though distinc-
tions must frequently be drawn, there is constant need for such 
an inclusive term. 
FIRST PRINCIPLES: QUEST FOR A GENERAL RULE 
The most intelligi~le way to state the law of priorities is 
by the familiar method of rule and exception, and this is the 
method which lawyers have always pursued, though frequently 
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a general rule is taken for granted rather than expressed and 
attention is confined to exceptions, or contrariwise, a general 
rule is asserted as an absolute, in which case we are to under-
stand that it was simply taken for granted that the exceptions 
were irrelevant. In using this method it is, of course, important 
to get a sound general rule, one which does not have to be eaten 
up by exceptions, and one which is not so obscure that its real 
meaning must be sought in its implications. What have we here? 
One of the broadest generalizations in the whole field of 
law is the ancient maxim, qui prior est tempore potior est jure. 
He who is prior in time is prior in right. As phrased, it does 
not tell us to what kind of cases it applies, so that, for example, it 
might seem to say that he who strikes the first blow in a fight has 
the stronger legal position, and that one who buys a share of stock 
in a corporation today has a better share than one who buys 
tomorrow. Without putting any more silly cases, it becomes 
apparent that the time-right maxim is not a safe general rule 
for all departments of the law. Its field of application must be 
narrowed by reading into it an implied term. Nor is it enough 
to narrow it to property cases. If you will think through the whole 
field of property, you will find many points where the time-right 
formula fits the results which we actually reach, but more, many 
more, where it does not.3 
Suppose we narrow to the cases of conflicting titles. Still we 
are in difficulties. In many of these cases the issue concerns the 
inherent efficacy of an alleged transfer, as when a deed is chal-
lenged as a forgery, or its delivery is denied, or question is raised 
as to the adequacy of the description of the locus in quo, etc. 
Again, it may be admitted that a deed is adequate in all formal 
respects, but fraud or mistake may be urged to vitiate it. In 
such cases, and others making up a long list, time-sequence has 
no significance. Even in a case involving issues on adverse posses-
sion, where there is a significant time-factor, it would not con-
a A complete review of property law from this angle would throw up some interesting 
cases, all of them, with strong policy factors. For example, you would think at once of 
the irrigation problem, where the law of some of our arid states gives the first appropri-
ator a superior right of appropriation, but the common law of England, in force almost 
everywhere in this country, does not. Primogeniture was the rule of descent in the old 
common law, but it has almost wholly disappeared. In nuisance cases, time-sequence 
means something: for example, in a typical case of householder against manufacturer, 
it makes some difference whether house or factory was there first, though you would not 
say that this is the primary factor in the case. Other cases can be found. But the out-
standing point would be that time-sequence is usually irrelevant. 
1959] PruoRITms 467 
tribute to a solution of the controversy to say, qui prior est tem-
pore potior est jure. 
There are obvious difficulties in the way of framing a def-
inition of the field in which the time-right maxim is a useful 
general rule. Yet one hesitates to consign it to the limbo of glit-
tering but meaningless generalizations. Not only is the maxim 
frequently used by the courts, but our standard terms for ex-
pressing the legal relation between conflicting titles reek of time-
sequence. "Prior," "priority," "senior," "junior," all have time-
relationship as their primary meaning, yet in the lawyer's mouth 
they signify, at least as often, a legal conclusion. This speaks more 
eloquently than any maxim of the prevalence of the notion that 
time and right are linked in a significant way. Let us, then, 
abandon the effort to define the jurisdiction of this maxim. After 
all, definitions are inconvenient things in this relative world. 
It will be more profitable to devote ourselves to an examination 
of certain priority problems where the maxim seems to make 
good. 
THE Two-SQUATTER CASE 
A took possession of Blackacre to which he had no title. Then, 
before the prescriptive period had run in A's favor, B, likewise 
without title, disseised A and now has possession. A sues B in 
ejectment. The time-right maxim gives judgment for A, and you 
will feel the more inclined to rely on it because other things seem 
to be equal. In fact A has usually won in such cases, and, if you 
seek a simple rule of thumb for this situation, you cannot do bet-
ter than qui prior est tempore, though you may do as well with 
the familiar doctrine that possession is title against all persons 
but the true owner. Either is, however, an over-simplification. 
The decisions are in confusion, and they can't be lined up in a 
simple yes and no, for count of the weight of authority. There are 
several lines of decision, and many cases which require inter-
pretation. One gets furthest toward reconciliation of the decisions, 
and at the same time achieves a socially wholesome doctrine, if 
one starts, not with time-sequence as his general rule, but with 
the public interest in peace. If the first squatter was forcibly 
disseised by the second and brought suit promptly, policy clearly 
favors the former. To deny him the aid of the state in regaining 
his possession, would mean that every squatter is an outlaw, open 
to disseisin by all comers, and anyone who ousted him would in 
turn be vulnerable to like attack by others, including his disseisee. 
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Even with Marquis of Queensberry rules against major violence, 
the result would be unseemly. Furthermore, we must not think 
of this problem as if squatters were a distinct race living in a world 
of their own. In fact they constitute an integral part of the relative 
world of landholders, and one cannot distinguish the squatter from 
the true owner at sight, as he can, if his eyesight is good, dis-
tinguish cock pheasants from hen pheasants. Therefore, if we 
declared an open season on squatters, we would be inviting attack 
on landholders generally. Finally, if we took this position, we 
would seriously complicate the business of protecting property 
rights. Landholders who sought the aid of a court would always 
be put to proof of title, and that is often a large order, both on 
the fact side and the law side. On the other hand, if we protect 
possession, as such, against mere intruders, we relieve the land-
holder from the necessity of proving more than possession, unless 
and until proof of more is forced by some showing of title in the 
intruder. Even then, we will not require proof of perfect title 
but only proof of a title better than the adversary's title. From 
several points of view, then, policy favors Mr. A, the first squatter. 
But suppose that Mr. B, squatter No. 2, entered peacefully in 
A's absence, and did so under color of title and in good faith, 
though in fact without title, and suppose that, before A brought 
suit, B enjoyed a long and undisturbed possession, though less than 
that necessary for title by prescription. Now policy does not speak 
so loud for A. Indeed, you may feel that it speaks for B. And 
you can make a very good showing for Mr. B on the authorities. 
Obviously there will be plenty of cases which lie somewhere be-
tween the extremes we have put, and through them policy does 
not draw any bright line. Yet the lawyer who has to advise in any 
of these sundry situations will be better equipped with the policy 
analysis, which points to distinguishing factors, than with the 
time-right maxim, which turns on a factor common to all of the 
cases. If and when the controversy gets into court, A's lawyer 
will, of course, argue the time maxim: for that purpose it is al-
ways useful to one side or the other in any priority problem. To 
complete the picture, both lawyers in the two-squatter case will 
argue legal doctrine concerning the right of a party in ejectment 
to avail himself of the title of a third person with whom he is 
in no way connected.4 
4 See note, 28 MrcH. L. REV. 184 (1929). Cases are collected in 46 L.R.A. (n.s.) 487 
(1913); 1918F L.R.A. 252. 
1959] PRIORITIES 469 
Tested by the two-squatter cases, the time-right maxim seems 
to be little more than a statistical truth, like the observation that 
juries favor natural persons, especially of female sex, over corpora-
tions, or that courts favor sureties. Speaking of that kind of thing, 
have you met the maxim, "Possession [ meaning present possession] 
is nine points [ out of ten] in the law"? This apothegm seems 
never to have found favor with lawyers, but it figures in lay dis-
cussion over the cracker-barrel, and sometimes in lay literature. 
The writer believes that, like the observations noted above, it 
contains a fair measure of statistical truth and might be useful 
to the lawyer in the discharge of his advisory functions. It will 
be seen that it moves in a different realm of thought from the 
time-right maxim. The latter purports to fix legal rights, to be 
realized in litigation, while the nine-point maxim suggests practi-
cal advantages, including the advantage of not having to litigate, 
and, if litigation comes, the advantages indicated by the maxim 
potior est conditio defendentis. For land cases, the nine-point 
maxim doubtless exaggerates the truth which it contains, but for 
chattel cases, at least for some chattel cases, the ratio should be 
99:1. 
CONFLICTING CHAINS OF TITLE 
It will be seen at once that our heading embraces the great 
bulk of priority problems. For that very reason, we must dis-
tinguish and classify. Suppose A presents a patent from the sov-
ereign to X, and deeds X-Y, Y-Z, Z-A. On the other hand, without 
connecting himself with the sovereign or with any one in A's 
chain of title, B shows· deeds U-V, V-W, W-B, and asserts continu-
ous adverse possession in V., W and himself for over twenty years. 
We have already seen that this problem cannot be solved by the 
time-right maxim. Time is significant with respect to the period 
of prescription, but time-sequence means nothing. Another case: 
A presents the same chain of title as before, and C, not connect-
ing himself with the sovereign nor with anyone in A's chain of 
title, presents a decree purporting to quiet title in V, and deeds 
V-W., W-C. Again the time-right maxim is useless. The problem 
turns upon the jurisdiction of the court and the construction of 
its decree. 
Already you see that the case where the time-right maxim 
is significant is the case where the two chains of title are inter-
connected, trace to a common source. For example, A shows patent 
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to X, and deeds X-Y, Y-Z, Z-A, and B, counting on the same 
patent, shows deeds X-W, W-B. You don't need to know much 
property law-you only need to keep your head on straight-to 
see that, if each of the deeds is an inherently effective transfer 
(genuine signature, due delivery, absent fraud, etc.), and if neither 
adverse possession nor bona fide purchase has intervened, the 
problem of priority between A and B is the problem of priority 
between Y and W, each of whom took a conveyance from X. 
And you know that on that problem the time-right maxim speaks 
loudly. Of course the same problem would be presented if B 
showed a deed directly from X to himself, or if he showed a deed 
or a chain of deeds from Y to himself, or from Z to himself. And 
it would be the same if B merely set up a mortgage from any of 
these parties in A's chain of title to himself, or to some third 
person with whom he connected himself by assignment. And so 
forth, at length. We have had to lay aside many cases in the process 
of narrowing our field of inquiry, but the type-case now before us 
represents an immense group of practical problems involving a 
great variety of transactions in land, goods, and intangibles. 
Conclusion, then: as a general rule, between conflicting titles 
both based on transfer from the same source, qui prior est tempore 
potior est jure. Now you will observe that this same class of cases 
comes within the terms of another maxim: Nemo plus juris trans-
ferre potest quam ipse habet. No one can transfer a greater right 
than he · himself has. In one respect, this is a better maxim than 
the time-right maxim: it tells us with some precision what kind 
of case it is talking about, so that we do not need to tack to it a 
scope-note. At the same time, it asserts all too vigorously the 
notion that no one can transfer more than he has. The mere 
implications of the words "transfer," "derive," etc. are dangerous 
enough, but to work with a maxim which shouts nemo potest is 
to invite misunderstanding. Without having taken count, the 
writer ventures the statement that the courts have made about 
equal use of these two maxims.5 That leaves us free choice, and 
the writer nominates the time-right formula. He likes it because 
it is a bald statement of a rule, with no pretense of putting the 
whole philosophy of priorities into one sentence. It also has the 
• 5 Here, and in all references to judicial use of these maxims, the intention is to 
include not merely formal statement of the maxims ,but the ,use of any paraphase which 
conveys the same thought. 
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advantage of being more terse, especially in the elliptical form, 
"first in time, first in right," and it can even be packed into that 
hyphenated "time-right" which we have used so frequently in 
the preceding discussion. Finally, it has the virtue of challenging 
our attention to the point that the first thing to do with a pri-
ority problem is to fix the critical dates, or, as you might say, 
to subject the case to chronological analysis. 
QUI POSTERIOR EsT TEMPORE POTIOR EST JURE: 
HEREIN OF ADMIRALTY LmNs, TAX LmNs AND TAX TITLES 
The last point, the importance of dates, remains true when we 
tum to certain cases where time-sequence operates in reverse. It 
is the general rule of maritime law that one who furnishes sup-
plies to a ship, or repairs a ship, or salvages a ship, gets a lien on the 
ship superior to all prior interests therein. It is commonly said 
to be a lien in rem. Justification for the rule is found in the policy 
of encouraging these beneficent activities. How else can a master, 
far from home, get the supplies he needs, or the services he needs? 
And it is to the ultimate advantage of those having prior interests 
in the ship that the master be able to keep the ship afloat and 
complete his voyage. From the rule as stated, it follows that if 
from time to time a ship gets supplies and/or services from sun-
dry persons, these persons have liens which rank in inverse order 
of time. The last shall be first, etc. 
In like manner, direct taxes on land are commonly made a 
lien upon the land paramount to all prior interests therein. The 
names of supposed owners may be placed on the rolls and personal 
notice of assessment may be given to them, but this is merely a 
point of convenience and courtesy. As matter of law, the state goes 
after the land, in rem, and publication is the only notice required, 
if any.6 Again you may advert to policy-the ship of state must 
be kept afloat for the good of all. Or perhaps you wiII think this 
but another instance of the immorality of government when its 
own interests are at stake. 
But the lien is merely a first step, a foundation for realization. 
6 Obviously this indicates a rule of action for everyone who has an interest in land: 
keep a weather eye on taxes. Lienors are peculiarly apt to overlook this point. Thinking 
of their interests as merely contingent and prospective, they are likely to ignore the 
hazard of taxes, though they would not do so in the case of property of which they were 
owners or purchasers. 
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If someone does not pay the tax seasonably, the state forecloses its 
lien by a tax sale. And in order to realize its advantage, the state 
offers to the purchaser a paramount title as of the time when the 
lien attached. But with tax liens, as with maritime liens, the last 
is best. Therefore the tax title is subject to the lien of taxes later 
than that for which the land is being sold, and if those taxes are 
not paid, the first tax title will be overtopped by a later tax title. 
Of course the burden of taxes is common to all other titles, 
and so we can say that a fresh tax title is, in theory, the best 
possible title-as good as a fresh patent from the sovereign, not 
yet stained by those flaws, which in the course of the years will 
inevitably gather upon it like moss. In the case of the tax title, 
however, there is more than the usual gulf between theory and 
practice. Tax statutes not infrequently run foul of the constitu-
tion, and the procedure of taxing officials is often faulty, and 
when litigation over tax titles throws up fact questions, a jury of 
the vicinage is not sympathetic with the tax title claimant. Further-
more, even if one can make the tax title stick, its enjoyment is 
not wholly enjoyable, by reason of prejudices at which we have 
previously hinted. For these and other reasons tax titles are seldom 
purchased by others than professionals, the "tax title sharks," 
and these gentlemen are always glad to release a title upon pay-
ment of the sale price with a fat rate of interest, even after the 
period of redemption has expired.7 
We have touched upon maritime liens and upon tax liens.and 
tax titles because a glance at these cases of inverse priority is 
illuminating. Among other things, we have here a simple demon-
stration that even when conflicting titles are derived from the same 
source, priority in time does not necessarily spell superiority in 
right. When it has that effect, it is because the law maker so 
chooses. This is not to say that it is silly or unjust or impolitic 
to prefer the first in time, as a general rule. At least that gives us 
a sensible solution where other things are equal,-for cases which 
throw up no material factors except the time-sequence. But that 
leaves open the really critical question: how much weight should 
be given to the time-sequence when there are substantial equities 
in favor of the later title? That is a question which we shall have 
7 Land taxes are not always put in this in rem shape, and personal property taxes 
seldom if ever are, but we need not examine other methods of tax gathering, for this 
is not a study in taxation. · 
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before us repeatedly in our examination of the more acute prob-
lems of priorities. 
TITLES MORE OR LESS DERIVATIVE: 
HEREIN OF MECHANICS' LIENS 
You can get a liberal education in priorities from a survey of 
the law of mechanics' liens. In all ( or almost all) of our states 
there are statutes giving liens to all ( or almost all) of those per-
sons (laborers, materialmen, contractors, architects, etc.) who con-
tribute to the erection of buildings, and, under many of the 
statutes, to those who in other ways engage in the improvement 
of land, e.g., by altering or repairing buildings, or by operations 
on the land itself, such as grading, ditching, etc. The statutes vary 
endlessly in their phraseology and they exhibit vital differences in 
the substance of their provisions, which makes generalization 
about mechanics' liens somewhat dangerous. Yet the statutes show 
striking likeness-their resemblances, it might be said, are at least 
as conspicuous as their differences-which is not surprising in 
view of the fact that, roughly speaking, they have like objectives 
which must be attained by like means under like conditions. Add 
to the picture the well known practice of importing legislation 
from one state to another, and the egually familiar practice of 
looking abroad for light on the construction of local statutes. 
Quite naturally it comes to pass that we have general principles 
of lien law, a study of which contributes to an understanding of 
each of the local systems. In the following discussion, we shall 
avoid questions concerning the scope of the statutes with respect 
to the kind of improvements, the kind of services and the kind 
of materials which are covered. We shall likewise avoid details 
of the procedure required for the perfection of liens-notice, 
suit, etc. These things are, of course, of first importance, for they 
go to the existence of the liens which are claimed, but we shall 
assume these conditions to be satisfied and direct our attention 
to the priority of the liens, or, as the conveyancer might put it, 
the "title" of the claimants. 
The primary plan of the statutes is disclosed in provisions for 
liens upon the interest of the "owner" who contracts for the im-
provement of the land. In one way or another it is made clear that 
it is not essential to the existence of liens that the contracting 
"owner" have an unencumbered fee simple, but it is also made 
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clear that, so far as concerns this primary provision, the liens at-
tach only to his interest whatever it be.8 In other words, the liens 
are derivative and consensual, in the same measure as the lien 
which the common law confers upon the ordinary bailee who 
stores or otherwise services chattels. Of course the common law 
never recognized a comparable lien in the case of land. But the 
contrast between land law and chattel law is greater than that. 
You may remember that common law gives the innkeeper a lien in 
rem, comparable to admiralty liens, and some courts have ex-
tended the doctrine to carriers. Then modern legislation has given 
like security to other bailees, notably garage-keepers. Do you see 
any reason why innkeepers, carriers and garagemen should be 
given greater protection than other bailees? Could you frame a 
brief for greater protection to all who service chattels than to 
those who service land? 
Derivation from the contracting "owner" is the primary plan 
of the mechanics' lien statutes, but some legislatures have toyed 
with in rem methods. If the "owner" has no title, or an inadequate 
title (say a life estate, or a fee loaded with prior liens) it follows, 
on fixture law, that he has no better title to any building he erects 
upon the land, and nemo plus juris transferre potest to the 
mechanics he employs. But the statutes to which we now refer 
provide that, where a new building has been erected contractors, 
laborers and materialmen shall have paramount liens on the 
building, without reference to the title of the "owner." That 
sounds very nice in the abstract, but what does it mean in the 
concrete? 
If the building is one which can easily (relatively easily) be 
moved from the land to another location, separate sale and re-
moval may enable us to work out something, though probably 
not much, for the lien claimants, and relief in that form will not 
8 The Michigan statute is fairly typical in its provision that, "Every person who 
shall, in pursuance of any contract . . . between himself . . • and the owner, part 
owner or lessee of any interest in real estate, build [etc.], •.. and every person who 
shall ... perform any labor or furnish materials to such original or principal contractor, 
or any subcontractor, in carrying forward or completing any such contract, shall have 
a lien ••. upon ... the entire interest of such owner, part owner or lessee, [etc.]." 
Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) §13101 [amended, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §570.1]. Would 
this statute apply where the person making the contract had a life estate?-a reversion?-
mere possession? Would it apply if his interest were inalienable?-or alienable only by 
a conveyance in which his wife joined, as in the case of estate by entireties or homestead? 
These and like questions we may lay aside. It is enough for our purposes that the 
statutes generally, if not universally, are of such character as to support the rather 
guarded statement in the text. 
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involve serious hazard to those who have superior interests in the 
land.9 But in any case, and more especially when the building is 
one which cannot easily be moved, the way to get maximum reali-
zation is to sell land and building as a unit, and distribute the pro-
ceeds ratably among the lien claimants and those having prior in-
terests in the land. Can it be said that this process involves no 
serious hazard to the prior interests? It may precipitate sale at an 
unfavorable time. Furthermore, sale under a decree cannot realize 
as much as private sale. Then, when we have sold, we propose to 
divide the proceeds: how? The only possible way is by valuing 
land and building separately, and dividing the proceeds in the ra-
tio so established. Anyone who thinks that this assures protection 
of prior interests in the land simply doesn't know enough about 
the vicissitudes of the land market and the vagaries of land valua-
tion. That is the practical problem.10 
Every story should have a moral. This lien on the building 
which the "owner" does not own may invigorate our philosophy 
of original titles and derivative titles. You will surely agree that 
this lien is not original in the sense that maritime liens and tax 
liens are original. It is based on an agreement with the "owner" 
who has some kind of title, at least the title which goes under the 
mystic name of possession. Furthermore, the adverse claims to the 
building asserted by those who have prior interests in the land 
are based on a somewhat extreme application of the law of fix-
tures. Therefore you can say that this lien statute merely effects 
a minor alteration in the law of fixtures. You cannot, however, 
make out that this lien on the building which the "owner" does 
not own is derivative in the ordinary sense, especially if it results 
in forced sale of the otp.er fellow's land. All this should help to 
limber up our concepts of original and derivative titles, thereby 
making them more useful in this relative world of priorities. 
A somewhat similar moral would come out of a study of the 
cases which have established a lien on the land itself as against 
9 It would be too much to say that there can be no injury to them: see Washtenaw 
Lumber Co. v. Belding, 233 Mich. 608, 208 N.W. 152 (1926), where an old building had 
been tom down and replaced by the building in question. 
10 The familiar process of partition by sale between cotenants is different in that 
the ratio of division does not have to be determined by valuation, but is fixed by the 
terms of the tenancy. Furthermore, the cotenants' situation is one into which they 
all have come either by purchase, their own voluntary act, or ·by gift or descent. On the 
whole, that case does not go far toward establishing the reasonableness of the partition 
sale which we are examining. 
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persons who did not, in person or by duly authorized agent, em-
ploy the mechanics, but are said to have impliedly consented to 
the improvement of the land. An implied agency? An informal 
statutory grant? That sort of analysis wears rather thin in some 
cases, ·especially if the statute charges those who "knowingly per-
mit" the improvement and this phrase is given a broad interpreta-
tion. The point is, of course, that as you move from contract, in 
the ordinary sense, through cases of actual consent evidenced by 
conduct, to cases where there is mere failure to prevent the work, 
you are moving toward, if not quite reaching, the realm of original 
lien, in rem. 
Yet the concept of derivative title predominates in mechanics' 
lien law. That, as we observed at the beginning, is the primary 
plan. The lien is derived from the "owner," carved out of his 
interest. His interest at what time? Nemo's maxim and the time-
right maxim concur in the answer to that question: it is his interest 
at the time when the lien arises. Therefore the painter who does 
the interior decorating gets a lien subject to the prior lien of the 
mason who finished his job before the painter began. But what 
of the plumber who installed the boiler while the painting was in 
progress? A microscopic application of the time-right maxim 
would mean liens for each of these mechanics, growing from day 
to day-indeed from minute to minute. But working out that 
theory in a court of justice would be a worse headache than un-
scrambling the bankrupt broker. Furthermore, as you think your 
way into the total situation, you will probably come to the con-
clusion that, as a matter of natural justice, time-sequence means 
nothing here, and all those who contribute services or materials 
to a unit-job (say a single building erecteq under one general con-
tract) should fare alike. Almost all lawmakers have taken this 
view. Put, as usual, in time language, all liens take effect as of the 
same date. 
But what date? That is a critical question for outsiders,-for 
example, the bank which lent money on mortgage of this land 
prior to the completion of the building. Here our lawmakers have 
split. Most of them have given all contractors, laborers and ma-
terialmen liens which relate back to the time the job ~as begun by 
visible operations on the land. The rationale is found in certain 
policy factors. A lien having priority as of a later date would give 
no assurance to one who was asked to furnish labor or materials 
at the beginning of the job. Do we want to impose that risk upon 
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them, or impair the "mvner's" credit facilities to the extent that 
they refuse to assume that risk? On the other hand, a lien as of an 
earlier date would be a wallop for anyone who had dealt with the 
"owner" on the faith of his title, as yet unencumbered but later 
subjected to the antedated lien. To give the lien priority as of the 
date when visible operations began is stiff, but we can at least say 
that it was possible for anyone dealing with the "owner" to see the 
operations, and so to understand what was likely to ensue, assum-
ing knowledge of the law. It should be added that prudence re-
quires inspection of the land in any case, by reason of the doctrine 
of notice from possession. So, by a process of elimination, we come 
to the date of visible operations. Other statutes, however, have ig-
nored the notice point, and date the liens from the execution of 
the "owner's" contract, without requiring the contract to be re-
corded. -A.pparently there is no way to guard one's self against the 
hazard created by that type of statute. 
Up to this point we have assumed that, in order to attain 
equality among the lien claimants, we must (I) give all of them 
liens as of the same date; and (2) make that date controlling on 
questions of priority as between the lienors and third persons, e.g., 
those who lend on mortgage during the progress of the building 
enterprise. Are these assumptions inevitable? Are they expedient? 
In the first place, it is clear that we could effect equality among 
the lienors without saying that their liens_ all relate back to a com-
mon date. It is quite enough to say that the fund which we are 
able to realize for them shall be divided among them pro rata. To 
express this by fictitious dating of the liens may be convenient, 
but it is so merely because this form of statement is elliptical: it 
implies the operation of the time-right maxim. Written out in 
full, the proposition would be: All the mechanics have liens as of 
the same date; therefore, under the time-right maxim, no one of 
them has priority over any other; therefore, they must share 
ratably. With all of the implications expressed, fictitious dating 
becomes the more cumbrous method of stating the rule of equality. 
It is equally clear that we do not have to use fictitious dates 
to give the lienors priority over intervening claims. For demonstra-
tion, we need only turn to a common form of statute which pro-
vides that all the liens "are preferred to any lien or other encum-
brance which may have attached subsequent to the time when the 
building or improvement was commenced." That states the rule 
at least as clearly and concisely, with no use of fictions. 
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Query whether the vogue of fictitious dating is due to its con-
venience, which is trifling, or to a notion; half conscious, unan-
alyzed, that the time-right maxim expresses an inexorable rule of 
law-that in the nature of things "priority is priority," and the 
only way .to prefer the later .claim is to make over the facts. Prob-
ably, for most of us, this use of time-language is no more than a 
habit of speech, but a bad habit if it is allowed to control our 
thinking. 
So far, all we have accomplished is to sweep out of the picture 
a· source of misunderstanding. The real problems remain. Let's 
split them up as far as possible. First, can we attain the desired 
equality among the lienors without giving all of them the same 
priority as against third persons? Merely as a mathematical 
problem, the answer is, yes. For example, where the "owner" has 
executed .a mortgage during the progress of the building operation, 
we could say that liens of A, B and C, who began their contribu-
tions before the mortgage was executed, are superior to the mort-
gage, but the liens of D, E and F, who began their contributions 
later, are subordinate to the mortgage: then th·e fund realized from 
the property, could be distributed thus: (1) set aside for the lienors 
the amount of the A, B and C liens; (2) from the balance of the 
fund, if any, pay the mortgage; (3) from the balance of the fund, 
if any, and-the sum first set aside, pay all the lienors pro rata. 
· That is easy enough, mathematically, but is the result humanly 
satisfactory? Even a good communist would not urge that levelling, 
-among the lienors, is the sole desideratum. Rather, he would say 
that, so long as we have private property, we must have a scheme 
of priorities, and in that kind of world, A, Band C, of our hypo-
thetical, have better claims, as against the mortgagee, than do D, 
E and F, and it is not altogether satisfactory to rob A, B and C 
:of that advantage in order to level the whole group. On the .other 
hand, it is not· altogether satisfactory to deny the mortgagee his 
natural advantage over D, E and F, though that will attain equality 
among the lienors without depriving A, B and C of their priority 
over the mortgagee. The problem, then, is one of choice: what, 
on the whole, is the best solution, or, if you please, the least ob-
jectionable solution? Thinking of that sort presumably went into 
the common statutes which protect all the lienors against trans-
fers subsequent to the commencement of the job. 
: . Our discussion, so far, has assumed that equality among the 
lienors is of first importance and that priorities as between the 
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lienors and third persons must be fitted to that in one way or an-
other. Obviously that is not an inevitable assumption. Some 
statutes do not observe the equity of equality at all. For all pur-
poses, each mechanic is given a lien as of the time when he com-
menced his contribution of service or materials.11 Then there is a 
compromise position, adopted in a few states. In certain cases (for 
present purposes we need not define them) all lienors will share 
ratably if there are no intervening rights of third persons, but, if 
a third party does intervene, the lienors are divided into two 
groups, the one consisting of those who are senior to the inter-
venor, and the other of those who are junior to the intervenor, 
equality prevailing within each group but not between the groups. 
Of course intervention of two third persons would give us three 
groups of lienors, etc.12 
Up to this point, our discussion has contemplated a unit-job, 
exemplified by a single building erected under one general con-
tract. You will, however, see at once that there must be acute dif-
ficulties in defining the concept of unit-job.13 Does it depend 
upon physical relations? If so, what about the double house, two 
apartments separated by a partition wall? What of the duplex, two 
apartments separated by a floor? What of the single dwelling with 
detached garage? What of a group of factory buildings designed 
for integral use, each part inadequate without the rest? Or does 
unity depend upon continuity in time? Several buildings erected 
for the same mvner on adjoining lots in successive years, each 
finished before the next is begun: several such buildings erected 
at the same time: a single building erected haltingly, with inter-
vals of inaction because of, let us say, financial difficulties? Or is 
the concept of unity dependent upon a hook-up by contract? Any 
number of detached buildings erected under one general con-
11 This, by the way, is the furthest frontier, in mechanics' lien law, of the time• 
sequence concept: nowhere are the liens regarded as accruing from day to day. 
12 See Wylie v. Douglas Lumber Co., 39 Ariz. 511, 8 P. (2d) 256 (1932), annotated 
83 A.L.R. 925 (1933). 
13 Caveat: The writer is in doubt whether the phrase "unit-job" is current coin in 
the profession. Certainly it is not commonplace, and it may be the writer's invention. 
Discussion of this problem in judicial opinions naturally turns on the phrases which the 
legislatures have used, which are various and in the main uncertain of meaning. The 
language of the applicable statute must, of course, be considered, but it seems to the 
writer that intelligent construction of the statute calls for recognition of the metaphysical, 
yet practical problems which necessarily arise from the nature of the situations with 
which the legislature is dealing. It is for this purpose that he features the phrase "unit-
job," which certainly is not to be found in any statute. 
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tract is a unit job, while a single building erected without -any 
general contract (or, as it is sometimes expressed, the "owner" 
being his own contractor) is as many units as there are contracts 
made by the "owner"? These questions should be answered with 
a view to the practical consequences of the several possible answers: 
(1) the effect upon the relations of the mechanics, inter se; (2) the 
effect upon the liens of mechanics as against intervening strangers; 
(3) facility of administration of the resulting rules. The statutory 
provisions which bear upon these questions vary widely, and all 
of them leave difficult questions of construction. The only accurate 
statement we can make concerning the resultant law is that all of 
the factors mentioned above enter in, with inevitable confusion, 
since these factors form endless combinations and permutations.u 
We have dodged the problem of defining unit-job, but we 
ought to be clear on one point. The need of defining this con-
cept arises chiefly from the grouping of lienors, whether for the 
purpose of achieving equality among them, or for the purpose of 
determining their priority as against third persons. However de-
sirable grouping may be, there must be limits upon it, a:µd the 
unit-job concept furnishes the most satisfactory approach to the 
definition of those limits. But it would be too much to say that 
· grouping of lienors is the sole occasion for the unit-job limitation. 
Even where each lienor .stands on his own feet, once we say that his 
lien dates from the commencement of his work or his delivery of 
materials, we must fix limits. The carpenter who works on a house 
of Mr. Owner today should not have a lien dating from his work 
on another house built for Mr. Owner ten years ago. Apparently 
the only way we could escape this unit-job problem would be to 
reckon priorities on the basis of day to day arrival of liens, 
which we have already found to involve acute difficulties of 
administration. 
Observe, further, that these statutes ordinarily require a no-
tice of claim and then a suit, each within a stated period after the 
end of the claimant's rendition of services or delivery of materials. 
Obviously that sort of regulation also necessitates a unit-job con-
cept. The same necessity would exist if we fixed the period with 
reference to commencement of the job. The only way to fix such 
time limitations without using this concept would be to merely 
14 See notes 10 A.L.R. 1026 (1921); 54 A.L.R. 984 (1928); 75 A.L.R. 1328 (1981): 97 
A.L.R. 771 (1985). 
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say that no lien should exist except for the value of services and 
materials furnished within a stated period prior to notice, etc. 
Then, the limitation would operate progressively from day to day. 
Compare the problem of limitation of actions on running account. 
Now we have one more river to cross. What amount is se-
cured by the liens of those who do not deal directly with the 
"owner," but with his contractor, or with the latter's subcontrac-
tor? The question concerns the extent of the lien even as against 
the title of the "owner." 
First, without having canvassed all of the statutes, the writer 
ventures the statement that in no case does indirectness of relation, 
in itself, preclude lien. Rather would he expect to find statutes of 
the sort which once were common, giving liens only to the hum-
bler sort of artisans, or perhaps including materialmen, but not 
contractors. 
Indirectness of relation does not preclude lien: but what is the 
extent of the lien? The commonest problem is that which arises 
when, at the end of the job, $X remains due from "owner" to con-
tractor, but $X + $Y is owing by contractor to laborers and ma-
terialmen. Do the latter have liens for $X only, or for $X + $Y? 
The lawmakers have split on this point. You can say that the two 
views involve, on the one hand more use, and on the other hand 
less use, of the concept of derivative title. In either view, the lien 
is derivative in the sense that it attaches to the title of the "owner": 
whether it goes further and takes on something of the in rem char-
acter is immaterial to the present inquiry, which concerns the 
extent of the lien as against the "owner." But many statutes con-
fine the indirect claimant to a lien measured by that of the con-
tractor with whom he has dealt, or, as it is often expressed, to a 
lien by subrogation. This is in the nature of a double use of the 
concept of derivative title. In its operation, this type of statute 
usually limits the indirect lien to a sum less than that which is 
owing as between the claimant and the intervening contractor, 
and it often gives the indirect claimant little or nothing. In this 
connection it must be remembered that the account as between 
contractor and owner depends not merely upon payments made on 
the contract but also upon set-off for breach of contract. Hence 
this type of statute tends, in practice, to reverse the policy of the 
earlier legislation, which was enacted solely or primarily in aid 
of those who were suffering from the intervention of irresponsible 
and crooked contractors between themselves and the responsible 
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land owner. The contracting system is a modern development, and 
this modern legislation aimed at one of its evils. In later years, the 
voice of the contractor has been heard in the legislative halls, and 
the protection of the lien law has been extended to him, subject to 
the overriding claims of those to whom he is indebted.15 That is 
proper enough, but should the contractor's creditors be limited to 
subrogation to his lien? 
Many legislatur~s, perhaps most of them, have answered this 
question in the negative. Subcontractors, laborers and material-
men are given "direct" liens. This is very nice for the laborers 
and materialmen, but rough on the "owner." He may pay his g~n-
eral contractor in full or breach by the contractor may more than 
off-set the balance due him, yet the "owner" may find his property 
plastered with liens. Assuming that the "owner" has the privilege 
of withholding payments from his contractor until assured that 
everyone down the line is properly paid (a point which should not 
be taken for granted, but should be studied in the light _of the con-
tract and the lien statute) there are obvious difficulties in the way 
of ascertaining the facts as payments become due, meaning prima 
facie due. Sometimes this type of statute enables the "owner" to 
require from the contractor a sworn statement of his accounts with 
subcontractors, etc., but query what protection this is to the 
"owner" who pays on a false statement? In greater or lesser mea-
sure, acc;ording to the legislative disposition of such details as we 
have mentioned, the direct lien is a man-trap. Where it flourishes, 
the "owner" should (1) at the start employ a lawyer who has had 
experience in this field, counting his fee as money saved; (2) take 
particular pains to get a contractor who is honest, competent and 
financially solid; (3) require from him an adequate bond; (4) re-
tain a competent and honest architect to supervise the job, and in-
cidentally get into the principal contract provisions which make 
him an oriental despot; and (5) pray. 
Finally, it should be observed that in setting out two clear-cut 
methods of securing the persons who do not deal directly with the 
"owner," we have oversimplified. That adequately pictures the 
two main lines of approach to this problem, but whichever of 
these is adopted, many nice questions will arise, each of which, 
15 Surely we don't need to canvass all the statutes before we can say that -the con-
tractor is never allowed to dip into the common fund until his subcontractors, laborers 
and materialmen are satisfied, at least so far as these creditors have appeared and 
established their claims. 
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viewed philosophically, presents to legislature and court the choice 
of making more use or less use of the concept of derivative title. 
Naturally, these little questions have not been answered uniformly 
by the lawmakers in either of the two main groups. Result: we do 
not, strictly speaking, have two types of lien law, but many; not 
two degrees of derivativeness, but many.16 
This closes our discussion of the priority problems which are 
generated by the mechanics' lien laws. But we should not leave 
this legislation without raising one last question of policy. Assum-
ing all details of the law to have been put in the best possible shape 
(of course men will differ as to what is the best shape, but let each 
suit himself), what, then, do you think of the policy of the whole 
system? There are those who say that the lien laws are responsible 
for notoriously unwholesome conditions in the construction indus-
try, viz., that men without experience and without capital, and 
even without integrity, can set up as building contractors, being 
enabled by this law to buy the necessary materials and place the 
necessary subcontracts, all on the credit of the "owner's" property, 
and that such contractors chronically bid below actual cost, to the 
injury of the whole industry, ~nd chronically fail in the midst of 
their undertakings, to the sorrow of all concerned. Without doubt 
there is truth in this position. How much truth? Do these un-
toward features, along with such others as you have been com-
pelled to leave in your ideal system, outweigh the advantages of 
your system?17 
BONA FIDE PURCHASE 
Bona fide purchase presents the philosophical problem of the 
one and the many. You may say that all the cases where one 
purchases, in good faith, land, goods or intangibles to which his 
vendor has no title, or a title less than he purports to sell, consti-
tute one legal problem, and that all of the law applicable to such 
cases is one body of law. If it is put that way, however, it is neces-
sary to add, in a mental footnote, that these cases differ one from 
another in circumstances which bear upon the relative equities 
of the parties and introduce variant factors of policy, with a second 
16Authorities are collected in notes, 20 L.R.A. 560 (1893); 50 L.R.A. (n.s.) 159 (1914): 
13 AL.R. 1072 (1921); 68 AL.R. 1263 (1930); 83 ALiR. 1152 (1933). 
17 See BROOKE, OrHER PEOPLE'S LABOR AND ·MATERIAL IN THE BUILDING INDUSTRY (1933); 
Cushman, "The Proposed Uniform Mechanics' Lien Law," 80 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 1083 
(1932); comment, Sixth Tentative Draft of Uniform Mechanics' Lien Statute, 41 YALE 
L. J. 271 (1931). 
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footnote that Anglo-American law has drawn distinctions which 
cut very deep. On the other hand, you may say that bona fide 
purchase is a term which embraces many distinct problems, which 
are governed by many distinct rules, though naturally enough 
these rules are somewhat similar to each other and to some extent 
have been consciously equated to each other, e.g., by taking the 
decisions as to what constitutes good faith under one rule as perti-
nent authority on the same question under another rule. It is sub-
mitted that you will achieve a better understanding of bona fide 
purchase if you look at it both ways. 
Of course this feature of bona fide purchase does not make it 
unique. It is merely one phase of the problem of classification, 
which appears in every corner of the legal woods with varying de-
. grees of difficulty and importance. There are two reasons for em-
phasizing it here. It is a particularly acute problem in the case of 
bona fide purchase. And the primary purpose of this note is to ar-
ticulate the law of bona fide purchase, to develop the interrelation 
of its sundry parts. 
The term "bona fide purchase" is ambiguous in that lawyers 
use it, (I) as a mere description of fact conditions, indicating that 
a purchase has been made under the belief that the vendor had a 
good title, with the implication that in fact the vendor had not a 
good title because there would otherwise be no occasion to talk 
of bona fide purchase, or (2) as the expression of the legal conclu-
sion that by reason of his bona fide purchase the purchaser got a 
good title, or at least got a better title than the vendor had, herein 
overcoming the primary canon of priority, or (3) as the name of 
a legal rule which dictates this result. In this note, the learned e9-i-
tor will doubtless be guilty of ambiguous use of this term. That 
can never be avoided unless, perhaps, by the adoption of obviously 
technical, nondescriptive terms, such as "abracadabra," to indi-
cate rules of law and legal conclusions. 
It was indicated above that we have, in effect if not in theory, 
many distinct rules of law for the problems of bona fide purchase. 
More than one of these rules is referred to as a rule of bona fide 
purchase, but other rules which are applied to bona fide purchase 
situations go by oth~r names, such as estoppel, or apparent author-
ity, or go without any handy name and suffer for it. 
Equitable Estoppel. We are not now concerned with estoppel 
by judgment, nor estoppel by deed, nor estoppel as between land-
lord and tenant or bailor and bailee, nor with any other (if there 
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be other) of the ancient common law estoppels, but with equitable 
estoppel (still so called, though it is now applied about as freely 
in legal as in equitable actions), otherwise known as estoppel in 
pais, alias estoppel by misrepresentation. Ewart's excellent treatise 
on Estoppel offers the following analysis of the subject, to which 
the present writer adds the bracketed comments. 
"The essentials of estoppel by misrepresentation will be con-
sidered under the following headings: 
I. There must be a misrepresentation. [But passive misrepre-
sentation, i.e., nondisclosure, may suffice.] 
2.- Either (1) by the estoppel-denier (pers~:mal misrepresenta-
tion); or (2) by some person whose representation he has made 
credible (assisted misrepresentation). [Or has otherwise aided or 
abetted.] 
3. There must be a disregard of some duty. [Query: Does this 
indicate a distinct factual element in estoppel, or just a wheel in 
the analytical machinery? That is to say, if the other elements are 
made out, is not breach of duty established?] 
4. The misrepresentation must be as to fact or law-not merely 
of intention or opinion. [But this terse statement is somewhat 
qualified by Ewart in Chapter VI, and if the writer had been more 
familiar with the American cases, he would have qualified 
further.] 
5. The misrepresentation must be of something material. 
[What do you mean, material?] 
6. Fraud or bad faith in the estoppel-denier is not essential-
an innocent misrepresentation will estop. [Query whether bad 
faith is not material-for example, may it not make up for weak-
ness at some other point, say the point of materiality? Are judges 
human?] 
7. Negligence (carelessness) is sometimes essential. [Query 
whether estoppel can be made out without some sort of moral 
culpability which can be called either bad faith or negligence?] 
8. The estoppel-asserter must be a person to whom immediately 
or mediately the misrepresentation was made. [Can we never fol-
low the analogy of tort and crime law-shooting at A and hitting 
B?] 
9. The estoppel-asserter must, on the faith of the misrepresen-
tation, change his position prejudicially. [May one change his po-
sition by doing nothing, while surrounding conditions change?] 
10. The estoppel-denier must have reasonable grounds for an-
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ticipating some change of position upon the faith of the misrepre-
sentation. [Can this point be wholly isolated from bad faith and 
good faith?] 
11. The change of position must be reasonably consequent 
upon the misrepresentation or the assistance." [Same comment as 
paragraph 10: and query how far the external standard is applied.] 
. These eleven propositions Ewart proceeds to elucidate in five 
hundred and nineteen pages. Perhaps the farther you go with 
that elucidation the less you will feel you know about estoppel, 
though you will, of, course, be getting the feel of the thing, which 
is· of first importance. You probably will come through with the 
conviction that· Ewart's eleven-fold analysis is quite useless as a 
succinct statement of the law, but most illuminating as a guide 
in your study of the law, as a set of sign posts telling you what to. 
look for, which is obviously what Ewart intended it to be. · 
The editor refrains from solving, here and now, the mystery 
of estoppel, but will venture a few observations upon its relation 
to the bona fide purchase problem. The concept of estoppel could 
hfl,ve been applied to all the cases which have in fact been disposed 
of by the rules of bona fide purchase, and the results would have 
been largely the same. So we find Ewart dealing with practically 
all these ·cases; in the main approving the results arrived at but 
quarrelling with the mode of reasoning, urging that an estoppel 
analysis would have been preferable. Of course, one wonders 
whether, if the estoppel concept had been applied to all these 
cases, the estoppel concept would today be what it is, since the law 
is shaped by the_ cases. Anyhow, Ewart's contentions and our specu-
lation about it gives us one clue to the relation of estoppel to bona 
fide purchase. 
We get another clue in this, that the estoppel concept is ap-
plied to a great variety of cases which could hardly be said to in-
volve bona fide purchase, in the descriptive sense, and to which the 
r_ules of bona fide purchase are inapplicable. For one example, "A 
man bitten by a dog asked a woman as to who owned it, and she 
said it belonged to her. He accordingly sued her. Held that she 
would .be. estopped from denying ownership on the trial if she 
knew that the inquiry was made for the purpose of finding out 
who was liable for the injury."18 So, in cases without number, the 
estoppel principle has barred an equitable action the institution 
18 Headnote, Robb v. Shepard, 50 Mich. 189, 15 N.W. 76 (1883). 
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of which has been unreasonably delayed with consequent change 
in defendant's position. Here estoppel has taken on the name of 
"laches" and with the multiplication of cases we have come to 
think of laches as a thing apart. The process is the sort which 
Ewart, speaking of another situation, aptly called "thought in a 
groove." But see Parsons v. Parsons,19 where a typical laches case 
was discussed entirely in terms of estoppel. So one might say that 
the rules of bona fide purchase constitute a specialized form 
of estoppel, and some of Ewart's remarks seem to involve that idea. 
But, if that is said, there should be emphasis on the word "special-
ized." The rules of bona fide purchase have enjoyed an independ-
ent life, not a tribal life in the bosom of the estoppel family, and 
they have acquired some habits, good or bad, which are not char-
acteristic of estoppel. So we find Ewart frequently quarrelling 
with the results reached by the rules of bona fide purchase. For 
example, he is quite unhappy about the distinction which is 
drawn between legal and equitable estates. Now we have another 
clue to the relation of things. 
We might sumarize thus: Estoppel is a very broad concept 
applicable to a great variety of situations, among others to cases 
of bona fide purchase, in the descriptive sense. It springs from 
elemental notions of policy and justice, and more than most rules 
of law it has been preserved from crystallization in formulae which 
might prevent resort, in its application, to its fundamental bases. 
On the other hand, the rules of bona fide purchase are highly 
specialized rules, each applicable to certain types of bona fide 
purchase, in ·the descriptive sense. They too have, perhaps, sprung 
from notions of justice and policy, but they have crystallized so-far 
as to make difficult a resort to first principles, except, of course, in 
borderline cases which fall where there is supposed to be a line but 
none exists. One of the consequences is this: if a purchaser can 
make out a case well within the rule of bona fide purchase, he has 
a clear case, and there is no occasion to talk about estoppel; if his 
case falls in the penumbra of the rule, he may well argue the ap-
plication of the rule and also argue estoppel; if his case falls clearly 
outside the rule, he can still argue estoppel and may get away with 
it-you never can tell about estoppel, unless the case happens to be 
exceptionally strong, or exceptionally weak. 
Before we close our crude sketch of this elusive subject, we 
19 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147 (1898). 
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should pay our respects to the famous dictum of Ashhurst, J., in 
Lickbarrow v. Mason: "We may lay it down," he said, "as a broad 
general principle, that, wherever one of two innocent persons 
must suffer by the acts of a third, he who ["by reposing trust in the 
third person" is often interpolated] has enabled such third person 
to occasion the loss must sustain it."20 Is this not a statement of one 
phase of estoppel, that which Ewart calls estoppel by assisted mis-
representation? Is not this form of statement oversimplified, and 
does it not contain a patent ambiguity? It is often advanced as an 
argument on behalf of a bona fide purchaser, as indeed it was by 
Justice Ashhurst. But in Foley v. Smith,21 it was turned against 
the purchaser, "who trusted the bank for the title, which it pro-
fessed to sell." 
What Do You Mean, Bona Fide? Now let us look at the rules 
of bona fide purchase. We have said that the term "bona fide 
purchase" is ambiguous in that it is descriptive of facts and indica-
tive of a legal conclusion and at the same time serves as the name 
of rules of law. If it were accurately descriptive of the facts which, 
under the rules, give the indicated conclusion, no harm could en-
sue. But that is not the case. 
"Good faith" does not, to say the least, tell the whole story of 
notice. To actual knowledge and actual suspicion, which touch 
good faith in fact, we add constructive notice, and therewith 
whole chapters of technical lore. There is notice by record (involv-
ing several man-sized problems,-e.g. the case of defective records 
through the fault of the recording officer,-e.g. lis pendens as to 
chattels), notice by possession (particularly tricky-e.g. the case of 
possession continued from one legal relation to another, as when 
a tenant for years becomes a purchaser-e.g. joint possession-e.g. 
discontinuous possession-and what is possession anyhow?), and 
finally that verbally neat but actually, in application, nebulous 
rule regarding facts which would put a reasonable man on inquiry, 
-in effect a negligence test. The nature 0£ the problems thrown up 
by this last was wittily expressed by Maitland, who complained 
that the English courts had gone so far that they demanded of a 
purchaser "not the care of the most prudent father of a family but 
the care of the most prudent solicitor of a famill aided by the 
skill of the most expert conveyancer." In their enthusiasm for 
20 2 T. R. 63 at 70, 100 Eng. Rep. 35 (1787). 
21 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 492 at 494 (1867). 
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constructive notice, students will sometimes charge a purchaser 
with notice of all the existing facts, because a reasonable man 
would have known that these facts might exist. Would this leave 
anything of the doctrine of bona fide purchase? 
Before leaving the subject of notice, we should observe that 
there is not one rule of notice for all cases, but many rules. For 
example, in negotiable paper cases, possession occupies an even 
larger place than in cases of land and goods, though it is not ordi-
narily discussed in terms of constructive notice but rather in terms 
of production and delivery of the paper as an essential to the com-
plete' transfer which makes one a holder in due course. On the 
other hand, it is said that the test of constructive notice is not 
negligence but bad faith. But we admit evidence of facts which 
would put a reasonable man on inquiry and one wonders how 
much difference it makes which test is laid down in the instruc-
tions. Generally speaking, negotiable paper and money may be 
equated, and likewise land and chattels, but one should not place 
unlimited confidence in the equations. 
What Do You Mean, Purchase'! I£ you agree with the editor 
that the term "good faith" conceals more than it discloses, you will 
surely feel that the term "purchase" is a downright fraud. For in-
stance, either of the parties to a sale may be a "purchaser," for the 
purpose in hand, the one purchasing land or goods or intangibles 
such as corporate stock, the other purchasing negotiable paper or 
money. For another instance, one may be a "purchaser" in a trans-
action of such nature that neither party would in ordinary par-
lance be called a purchaser,-as when money is paid in satisfaction 
of a debt. How about mortgages, pledges, and other security trans-
actions? And what is the meaning of the statement, sometimes seen, 
that a mortgagee is a purchaser pro tanto'! 
Why not rewrite our formula-make it "bona fide transfer"? 
But not all bona fide transferees are protected. Value must be 
given for the transfer, and the term "purchase" has, perhaps, a 
virtue in that it vaguely suggests this requirement. 
The law concerning value is Jiorribly confused. The strict 
view is that the purchaser must give "present value," excluding 
the transferee who takes property in satisfaction of, or ru; security 
for, an antecedent debt, and likewise excluding the transferee who 
has merely made a promise to the transferor, even though the 
promise created a contract obligation. The idea is that the equity 
of bona fide purchase rests upon irretrievable change of position, 
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such that the transferee cannot be restored to status quo ante when 
the defect in the transferor's title appears. On that postulate, 
should payment of money or other transfers of property be held to 
constitute "value" in themselves, without a showing that they can 
not be recovered by rescission, etc.? 
At any rate, the present value rule appears to be too strong for 
mere human flesh, for it is nowhere maintained in its entirety. A 
creditor who receives a payment of money in good faith is always 
protected, ancl by the weight of authority, now confirmed by 
N. I. L:, the transferee of negotiable paper either as payment or se-
curity of an antecedent debt is a holder in due course. With land 
and chattels, the strict view flourishes, but several courts have held 
that discharge of an antecedent debt is value, though holding that 
security of such debt is not value, and it has sometimes been held 
that both cases involve value. (This being also the view of the Uni-
form Sales Act.) Furthermore, it is usually (perhaps universally) 
held that if a creditor, taking security for an antecedent debt, 
agrees to extend time for a definite period, the length of which 
seems to be immaterial, he is a bona fide purchaser, at least if he is 
not charged with notice before the period of extension expires. Of 
course there is more here than mere security of an antecedent debt, 
viz., the promise not to sue, and there is more than mere promise 
after the period of extension has expired, viz. there is performance. 
But is there any difference from the point of view of substantial 
change of position? 
How about the creditor who fixes a lien on the property by at-
tachment, judgment, or execution? It would not be absurd to call 
such a creditor a "purchaser," that being in this context a technical 
term. But the rule against antecedent value stands in the way, and 
while that rule has been relaxed by some courts, the editor does not 
know of any single case which has held that such a creditor is a 
purchaser for value. But suppose the creditor's proceeding goes on 
to execution sale and, as usual, the creditor buys at that sale 
for the amount of his judgment or a lesser sum, which is credited 
on the judgment after deducting the sheriff's fees: is the creditor 
now a purchaser for value? Authorities differ on this point and so 
you have a question to consider "on principle." Which way do 
you go? 
There are a few decisions that even a third person who 
purchases at execution sale ~nd pays cash is not a bona fide 
purchaser because the sheriff does not purport to give a good title 
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but only to sell the interest of the judgment debtor, whatever that 
may be. Compare purchase by quitclaim deed. 
In examining decisions regarding title at execution sale, 
whether of third person purchaser or creditor purchaser, it is im-
portant to distinguish between the case of defect in the judgment 
or in the execution procedure and the case of defect in the debtor's 
title, a distinction which has not always been observed in encyclo-
paedic citations. 
Inadequacy of consideration is immaterial, except as evidence 
on the issue of good faith. And when the consideration for a trans-
fer is in part present value and in part discharge (or security) of 
an antecedent debt, it has been held that the purchaser, if without 
notice, is fully protected. Yet, where a purchaser pays part of the 
agreed price without notice of the prior interest and then receives 
notice before he has completed his payments, it seems never to 
have been held that the prior interest is cut off, simpliciter. On the 
other hand, there is little if any authority (some of the cases are 
obscure) for the view that the purchaser is not to be protected at 
all. There are two respectable lines of authority, one giving the 
purchaser an equitable lien for what he has paid before notice, the 
other giving him the property subject to an equitable lien in favor 
of the prior party for the unpaid balance of the price. Which is the 
better solution? Is either one right? How do they square with the 
decisions on mixed consideration, or the decisions on inadequate 
consideration? Suppose A has paid X dollars as the whole price of 
land worth 2X dollars, and B has paid Y dollars as half the price of 
land worth 2Y dollars? And there is an interesting problem of con-
structive notice in some of these partial payment cases. Suppose 
the purchaser pays part of the price on an instalment contract, and 
then the instrument which created the prior interest is recorded: 
does the record give notice to the purchaser?22 Note that in cases 
where the purchase money is not fully paid before notice, you are 
likely to find that there is no conveyance before notice, raising 
another question which will be touched on later. 
We have seen that the definition of value has been relaxed in 
favor of the purchaser of negotiable paper, but even he cannot 
make a case on mere promise of value. What, then, shall we say of 
the case of a bank which, without notice of defect in its customer's 
title, receives from the latter a check which it credits to his ac-
22 See Jaeger v. Hardy, 48 Ohio St. 335, 27 N.E. 863 (1891). 
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count? Is it, without more, a holder in due course? If not, what 
more is needed? Suppose the bank, still without notice, sets off 
the deposit against the depositor's note? Suppose that, when the 
deposit is received, the bank holds the depositor's note for a sum 
exceeding the total deposit, but it does not act in the way of book-
keeping set-off until after notice? Suppose the wrongful deposit is 
followed by a series of deposits and withdrawals, the account 
always showing a balance in excess of the amount of the wrongful 
deposit until notice of the adverse interest is received? 
What Is the Legal Effect of Purchase in Good Faith? In our 
cursory examination of the definitions of value and good faith, 
we have found considerable unity in the subject, along with con-
siderable diversity, the unities perhaps preponderant. As we go on 
to other aspects of bona fide purchase, we shall find diversities so 
great that family resemblance alm~st disappears. 
Can we say that one who is a purchaser (giving value in the 
fullest sense) in good faith (without notice, actual or construc-
tive) necessarily gets good title? Of course, we cannot. Neither 
would it be wise to say that "in general" the bona fide purchaser 
prevails, and then state exceptions to that rule, for that has not 
been the common law approach. We started with "the fundamen-
tal principle of property, which secures the title of the original 
owner against a wrongful disposition by another, and which does 
not permit one to transfer a better title than he has. The party who 
claims the benefit of the exception to this principle must come 
within all the conditions on which it depends."23 In other words, a 
bona fide purchaser, like any other transferee, ordinarily gets no 
better title than his transferor had. How far, then, and in what 
cases, does the bona fide purchaser rise to a higher level? No 
useful answer to this question is possible, except one framed in 
terms of particular species of bona fide purchase. 
The Equitable Doctrine of Bona Fide Purchase. In its oldest 
form, the doctrine seems to have been purely defensive, and to 
have drawn no distinction between legal and equitable estates. To 
a bill seeking equitable relief with respect to property, it was a 
good plea, excusing answer, to show purchase in good faith.24 In 
course of time, the doctrine developed into a rule of property 
23 Justice Campbell in Combs v. Hodge, 21 How. (62 U.S.) 397 at 405 (1858). 
24 See Bassett v. Nosworthy, Rep. t. Finch 102, 23 Eng. Rep. 55 (1673), a bill filed 
by an ,heir against a purchaser from devisees for discovery of a revocation of the will. 
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which could be made the basis of affirmative relief to the purchaser, 
but it was at the same time narrowed to the terms familiar today, 
viz. that bona fide purchase of a legal estate cuts off outstanding 
equities. The type case is bona fide purchase from a trustee (selling 
wrongfully, not in the exercise of a power of sale) cutting off the in-
terest of cestui. A case of particular interest in this course is that of 
purchase of the legal estate cutting off equitable liens. It happens, 
however, that this is not nearly as frequent here as in England. 
Reasons: In England, all junior mortgages are merely equitable, 
while here they are probably legal; there money is frequently lent 
upon a mere deposit of title deeds, creating an equitable lien, while 
here that practice is almost unknown; and finally our recording acts 
cut across this field and, where they apply, make the distinction 
between legal and equitable interests immaterial. Of course, the 
land recording system is much more complete than the chattel 
recording system, and so there is more room for the operation of 
the equity rule of bona fide purchase in the latter case than in the 
former. Per contra, the fugitive nature of chattels disposes of 
priority problems in fortuitous ways (identification, proof of title 
history, etc.) and perhaps it is a stand off. 
Most of the reported cases involve purchase of the fee simple 
of land or the corresponding "absolute ownership" of chattels, and 
the rule is commonly stated in terms of purchase of "the legal 
title." There is, however, good authority for the protection of a 
bona fide purchaser of a lesser legal interest, e.g., a term for years, 
as against a prior equitable interest. What, for the purpose of this 
equity rule, is the nature of a mortgage, in those states which say 
that it does not transfer title but merely creates a lien? Is it a legal 
lien or an equitable lien? The question may arise in either of two 
ways: (1) mortgage followed by bona fide purchase from mortga-
gor, or (2) trust or equitable lien followed by mortgage by the 
trustee or the owner subject to the equitable lien, with value given 
in good faith by the mortgagee or by an assignee. Of course, as in-
dicated above, most of the cases of either type will be governed by 
the recording acts, but a few escape the provisions of the statutes 
and turn, or may be made to turn, on the equity rule. 
Emphasis on legal title has been carried this far, that even 
when the transferor has legal title and the purchaser parts with 
money in good faith, the latter is not protected unless he obtains 
a conveyance before notice. But this objection has often been 
surmounted, in one way or another, and this is rather to be ex-
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pected if the purchaser's case is properly handled, because the 
objection is so artificial. The point which goes to the justice 
of the purchaser's claim is change of position without notice, and 
if we insist on legal title at all it should be merely insistence on 
such title in the vendor, inviting the purchaser's reliance. In this 
respect, the case in hand is very different from that to which the 
English courts applied their famous doctrine of tacking. There a 
purchaser of an equity who found the legal title in a third person 
could get in that title and thereby protect his equity. There are 
miscellaneous cases here in which the bona fide purchaser of 
an equitable estate, the legal title being outstanding, has been pro-
tected against prior equities, but it is doubtful whether any one 
of them can be regarded as authority for a general rule protecting 
the purchaser of an equity. It will usually be found that the case 
went off on the theory that the prior claimant was estopped by his 
conduct. Sometimes there is talk of "superior equities:" That may 
be regarded as an informal expression of the estoppel principle, 
but in some instances it ·pretty clearly involves the idea that 
equitable interests are of various rank, so that the king can take 
the queen and the queen can take the jack. The difficulty with 
the latter notion is that there is no agreement on the grading 
system. All that comes clear is the general rule that, as between 
competing equities, the prior prevails, bona fide purchase going 
for naught, and the estoppel 'exception based on the prior claim-
ant's conduct. 
What do you think of the equity rule, from the point of view 
of justice and policy? What do you think of its general shape, 
and what do you think of its details? The question is worth serious 
thought because, among other things, it will lead you into a con-
sideration of the actual working of the law. The reports do not 
indicate that the judges have been much moved by considerations 
of policy, yet the absence of policy argument in the opinions is not 
convincing evidence that policy has not actuated the decisions.25 
[To be concluded.] 
. 25 An illuminating discussion of the equity doctrine will be found in HUSTON, 
ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY 114-148 (1915). A useful collection of cases, chiefly 
under the equity rule, will be found in 23 AM. & ENG. ENc., 2d ed., 472 (1903), title, 
Purchaser for Value and Without Notice. In CYc. and C.J., and in the American Digest, 
there is no such head, and the cases are gathered with considerable confusion of the 
several rules, under Vendor and Purchaser (land), Sales (chattels and some choses in 
action), Mortgages (land), Chattel Mortgages, Pledges, Contracts, Assignments, Execution, 
Judicial Sales, and who knows how many other heads. 
